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by Edward W. James ~L ---I &
Cardinal John Henry Newman in the
spring of 1852 delivered a series of lectures,
eventually published as The Idea of a
University, which argued against those who
thought that education should be useful.
These proponents of utility maintained "that
Education should be confined to some
particular and narrow end and should issue
in some definite work" -- a view, Newman
observed, which they "seemed to have
thought ... needed but to be proclaimed ...
to be embraced." Were Newman here
today he would soon see that the issues
troubling him trouble us. To be sure, we face
now new slogans, crying not only for
"utility" but, a decade ago, for "relevance"
and, today, for "jobs." Yet the questions are
much the same, focusing on whether a
college education should guarantee the
immediate results of a specific product.
Newman's reply to the proclaimers of
utility (or relevance or jobs) was, first, that
education aimed for something far more
important, and second, that its aim was
ultimately more useful and relevant than any
specific product. For the aim of a college
education was nothing less than
enlargement of mind -- in his words,
the power of viewing many things at once
as one whole, of referring them severally to
their true place in the universal system, of
understanding their respective values, and
determining their mutual dependence (VI,
6).
The value of this disposition of mind,
Newman charged, far transcended any
training for a specific function. For a person
who has attained such an enlargement of
mind "will be placed in that state of intellect
in which he can take up anyone of the ...
callings" and so be better equipped to deal
creatively and insightfully with his or her
development as well as with the changes
and variety of society (VII, 6).
Nevertheless, granting that Newman's
reply has been influential and sounds pretty,
is it true? Remember that when Newman
delivered his lectures the word "science"
had been coined just a decade before,
Newton and his non-relativistic views on the
independence of space and time reigned as
absolute monarchs, mathematics was still
unclear about alternative geometries and
had not yet dreamed of the paradoxes of
infinite sets, Darwin's Origin of Species was
seven years from publication, economics
had established itself as a distinct discipline
less than a century before, psychology was
almost four decades from being seen as an
independent inquiry, and Newman himself
felt no reservation in addressing his
audience solely and repeatedly as
"Gentlemen." Clearly, gentlepeople, we
have come a long way. So, as pretty and apt
as it sounds, is Newman's view true? Is it the
case that one will or should learn at the
College how to refer things to their true
places in the universal system?
I believe it is obvious that we cannot
answer that question unless we go to the
disciplines themselves. And to give us some
direction, let us ask a question of the
disciplines -- ay, How can we understand
human activity?
One obvious discipline to help us answer
this question is psychology. There we wil~
read, say, B.F. Skinner, who holds that our
desires and feelings cannot explain our
behavior. For, Skinner argues, a person
never does anything because he or she
wants to do it: wanting, feeling, desiring, and
all such mental acts are the mere shadows of
the true causes. This is so, according to
Skinner, because a person is best
understood in behavioral terms -- as a
"complex repertoire of behavior appro-
priate to a given set of contingencies." And
what determines whether a behavior
pattern is appropriate is whether it has or
tends to have, survival value. Hence the true
causes must be looked for within an
environment defined by an evolutionary
framework. Accordingly, why one does
what one does must be explained, says
Skinner, within an evolutionary-behavioral
model.
So now, after reading Skinner, can we say
that we have one piece in the "Universal
System" of knowledge? Can we say that we
have heard from psychology? We can,
provided we read only Skinner. But turn to
another influential psychologist, say, Phillip
Teitelbaum, and we read that Skinner is
right in telling us that we do not act from
feelings but is wrong in telling us to look to
the behavioral environment for the true
causes. Not there but the central nervous
system is the source of explanation of
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human behavior. In Teitelbaum's words:
The nervous system is what makes us tick,
so we take it apart. Chop it into smaller
chunks and our behavior also
decomposes into smaller fragments.
Intergrate the units of the nervous system
and you synthesize behavior.
What one does, then, must ultimately be
accounted for in terms of the central
nervous system. But do not stop with these
two thinkers. Continue and read, say, Carl
Rogers, who views a person as a "self-
actualizing process of becoming," and who
consequently insists that desires and hopes
and the like must be considered in
understanding people. For these are central
to the matrix of self-actualization: to
exclude them would be to omit what is most
significant about us.
It seems, then, even on the basis of this
brief look, that the question, "What does
psychology tell us?" is ludicrous, for
psychology does not tell us anyone thing. It
is not a monolithic discipline. Rather sharp
disagreement abounds over the most
fundamental matters. In our glimpse we saw
this disagreement focus on where to look for
an explanation of human activity: What are
"the facts"? -- our behavior, neurological
organization, purposes and plans? Yet
implicit within this question lie a number of
others, concerning the very aim of
psychology and the place and nature of
values and humanity in it.
If we had time we could observe that
similar disagreements exist throughout the
social sciences. Like psychology they are all
deeply divided, and within themselves,
concerning (1) their aim -- description,
prescription, explanation, revolution? (2)
their method -- prediction and control,
valuational analysis, empathic under-
standing, dialectical analysis? (3) and even
their topic -- just what is society, a person,
politics, economics anyway? But for the
sake of time let us put this more extended
examination aside, and turn to the physical
sciences.
There, too, unanimity eludes us: quasars,
red shifts, the myriad small particles of
physics, relativity theory, the status of quan-
tum mechanics -- all leave room for
profound and widespread disagreement.
However, what I wish instead to focus on, in
this brief excursus into the physical
sciences, is their historical nature.
For even when we find general agreement in
the physical sciences, the content of the
agreement has changed radically from
epoch to epoch. For instance, if we
were able to and did transport some
physicists of one to two millenia ago to the
present and asked them to explain human
behavior, they would dismiss the question
as absurd for a physicist to answer. For
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questions belong to the theory of
deliberation and not the theory of the
heavens. Yet were we to question physicists
of one to three centuries ago they would
probably be more willing to reply. Indeed
they might even refer us to that sixteenth
century thinker Laplace, who reasoned that
an "intelligence, who for a given instant
should be acquainted with all the forces ...
and with the ... positions of the entities,"
and who also knew their laws, would know
all. "Nothing would be uncertain for him; the
future as well as the past would be present
to his eyes." Hence human action for our
physicist of one to three centuries ago is
fully explicable and predictable in terms of
(1) the positions and forces of the physical
bodies at (2) a given instant of the universe --
a view which we have come to call classical
determinism.
But now, if we ask physicists of today our
question, we would find them probably to be
one of two types -- a "believer" or a
"sceptic." Both would reject in toto the
classical thesis of determinism but for
different reasons. The believers would
reject the deterministic thesis on two
grounds: First, they would point out that
Einstein showed that there is no "given
instant" to the universe as classical
determinism held, for time is a local
phenomenon, intertwined with acceleration
and mass. Hence, contrary to classical
determinism, there is no "universal
moment" common to all things and thus
there is no possibility of determining the
nature of all things at such a "moment."
Second, the classical determinist view of a
thing as having a definite force and position
or "nature" must be dismissed, for quantum
mechanics has shown that there is a real
indeterminacy in regard to particles having
both specific force and position. Hence
human behavior, if understood as
influenced by the micro-entities of quantum
mechanics, could not be clearly predicted
and at best might be seen within the
matrices of probability functions. The
sceptical physicists, however, would reply
that what is crucial in science is not the
general agreement on the current position
but that the current position has always
been rejected. Consequently, there is no
reason to believe that the position agreed on
today will be the final position, or indeed,
that there will ever be a final position. And if
some wish, as our believing physicists wish,
to assume that physics in particular and
science in general "progress" to the real,
they must give a reason for this faith. For
since when does predictive power entail an
understanding of the real? That we are able
to control more does not mean we know
more. To think so is to confuse knowledge
with magic. Rather, our sceptical physicist
concludes, physics does not speak of the
real but instead provides us with convenient
mathematical tools, which we label formulae
and theories, and which organize our
experiences. Science, like any tool, is
neither true nor false but useful or not
useful.
"But what of the scientific method?"
someone might ask here. "Isn't the scientific
method a point of agreement on which we
can build?" Well, to answer this question we
must critically examine "the method" -- a
difficult task, since for some to criticize the
method is to criticize the divine. But let us
start out by recalling what the scientific
method is popularly held to be -- a
procedure in which we are to (1) observe the
facts, (2) construct an explanatory
hypothesis, (3) deduce (preferably novel)
predictions from the hypothesis, (4)
compare what is predicted with what
happens, and (31 determine whether the
hypothesis is confirmed, refuted, or
requires revision.
However, we shall find pronounced
disagreement here as well. To begin with,
we have already touched on some of the
difficulties in applying this method to the
social sciences: How can we observe "the
facts" when what is in question is what the
facts are? and why should we construct
predictive hypotheses when what is in
question is whether people can be
understood in this way? While physics and
chemistry do not have the second problem,
they do have the first -- especially when it
comes to the frontiers of their disciplines.
Moreover, when they do not have the
problem of what "the facts" are, when they
do by and large enjoy agreement as to what
counts as evidence, first, we will have to
recall that these "facts" change from
historical epoch to epoch, and second, we
must realize that this agreement leads them
not to teach the so-called scientific method.
For, recall how many of the answers are in
the back of the book. Yet how can there be
answers, when the method tells us to reject
these answers that are not personally
validated by us? Or consider how you did or
will approach a laboratory problem. Say
that you are told that a microscope should
reveal red circles on this slide. But, alas, no
matter how hard you look, you fail to see the
red circles. You adjust and readjust the
knobs. You call a friend in to adjust and
readjust the knobs. But no red circles. The
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only red circles are those in your eyes from
pressing so hard against ·the microscope;
and you can't see those either, since you
have no mirror. So then, do you conclude
that the theory is false? n that it is to be
dismissed? By no means. You might be
dismissed, by the professor, but not the
theory. What these reminders indicate is
that it is not the theory that is being tested
here but the student n as is seen by how you
panic when your answers don't agree with
those in "the back of the book" or when you
don't see the red circles. Hence, it seems
quite misleading to insist that the scientific
method as just stated is what we learn and
master in science courses. We learn to
compute right answers, to see red circles,
that science is arbitrary or subjective in the
way a personal decision n say one's
preference for chocolate ice cream h is
subjective. But it is to say that the standards
and canons of science are determined from
within the practice, which itself is an
historical endeavor and so is continually
open and in flux. Consequently, we can no
more look to "the method" of science as
providing us with that touchstone on which
we can all agree than we can look to "the
method" of ethics or religion. All of these
endeavors are cultural and so temporal
phenomena. Hence their methods will not
only vary from epoch to epoch but also will
be open to dramatically different
interpretations.
unable to appreciate or understand each
other. And in an era when all of the
disciplines are especially needed to face the
troubles of the world, the "degree of
incomprehension on both sides is the kind
of joke which has gone sour" (p. 18). A
mere scientific education is narrow, yes, but
so is a mere humanities education.
But for many, and by now no surprise,
Snow does not go far enough. It is not that
we are separated by ignorance but that the
literary culture is not worth knowing.
Francis Crick, who with James Watson
worked out a structure for the DNA
molecule, argues that Snow's mistake was
to "underestimate the differences" between
the two cultures:
.. . the College offers no invitation to
see how everything falls into its place
but rather offers an invitation tofind
out where the disagreements are
concerning how things fit into their
places, and indeed whether there are
things to fit and places to fit into.
and to measure carefully; but we do not
learn to criticize the current theory.
The justification for such an approach is
that it is extraordinarily effective and no one
has come up with a better one. In the words
of one of the major philosophers of science
today, Thomas Kuhn:
Without wishing to defend the excessive
lengths to which this type of education has
been occasionally carried, one cannot help
but notice that in general it has been
immensely effective. Of course, it is a
narrow and rigid education, probably
more so than any other except perhaps in
orthodox theology. But for normal
scientific work ... within the tradition that
the textbooks define, the scientist is
almost perfectly equipped.
The intent of an education in science,
accordingly, is for the student to attain to
the levels and standards of the current
theory. Hence education in the physical
sciences is not much a matter of criticism as
it is a matter of initiation .- initiation into the
formulas, facts, and methods employed at
that time in the discipline. In this sense of
introducing the student into a total system
of techniques, strategies and standards,
science is "subjective." This is not to say
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In addition to being divided within
themselves, moreover, the academic
disciplines are also divided from one
another in part by ignorance and at times in
part by profound differences concerning the
status of the humanities and humanity's
place in nature.
That the disciplines are divided from one
another by ignorance is no news. C. P.
Snow was saying decades ago that a
scientific education is narrow. He observes
that Charles Dickens, who among novelists
is considered as all too obvious, is too often
viewed by scientists as though "he were an
extraordinarily esoteric, tangled and
dubiously rewarding writer . . . the type
specimen of literary incomprehensibility.
But Snow does not stop here. He goes on
to ask:
But what of the other side: They are
impoverished too perhaps more
seriously because they are vainer about it.
They still like to pretend that the
traditional culture is the whole of 'culture'
as though the natural order didn't exist.
(p.10).
What we are left with, says Snow, is at least
two cultures, the literary and the scientific,
The old or literary culture, which was
originally based on Christian values, is
clearly dying, whereas the new culture, the
scientific one, based on scientific values, is
still in an early age of development. ... [t is
not possible to see one's way clearly in the
modern world unless one grasps this
division between these two cultures and
the fact that one is slowly dying and the
other, although primitive, is bursting into
life.
For Crick, then, we have only one legitimate
culture, the scientific one, with the residue
as decadence. But such a divisive claim!
Why. does he make it? He does so because
he believes that the "ultimate aim of the
modern movement of biology is in fact to
explain all biology (and eventually all human
life) in terms of physics and chemistry," (p.
10). That is, the model Crick has of scientific
understanding is that of a ladder, where the
happenings in large groups -- currently
studied by sociology, economics, and the
like n will eventually be explained by (the
lower rung of) psychology, the study of
individual behavior, which in turn will be
reduced to (the next rung of the ladder)
physiology, the study of the nervous
system, which in its turn will be reduced to
biology, the study of life systems, and then
to chemistry and, finally, to (the bottom and
basic rung) physics. In contrast to the
sceptical understanding of science, which
views such a ladder of knowledge as at best
a possibility for exciting but ultimately
curious correlations, Crick sees the ladder
as a reality not yet fully borne out but
nevertheless providing a justification for
holding that the source of all legitimate
explanations and values resides only in
science and ultimately in physics.
Accordingly, the literary culture, in
pretending that it is a source of insight and
value, is playing the fool's role.
Of course the "other" culture is hardly
quiet before such an onslaught. But what is
important for us to note here is that the
discussion continues. But to what end? --
Just that, perhaps by now obviously
enough, is what cannot be said. For where
such disagreements exist, there
"knowledge," in Newman's sense, does not.
But this result should not lead us to deplore
the state of "knowledge." Rather it should
challenge us to reconceive it: To grasp the
human activities of learning and
understanding, we must no longer look, as
Newman in the nineteenth century did, to
those calm areas of agreement and unity,
but instead we must seek out the turbulence
of controversy. For as we have seen
repeatedly, understanding is an historical
happening. It is not a list of eternal truths but
a groping for the precise articulation and the
sustained analysis of those issues that divide
us. To learn, as Newman so clearly saw, is
an enlargement of mind. But it is not,as he
believed, the awareness of how things fit
into "their true place in the universal
system." Rather enlargement of mind
involves seeing the issues which divide us,
and understanding these issues as cultural n
meeting our particular needs at this
particular time; historical -- developing and
emerging in time; multi-faceted n embracing
many fields in bewildering complexity; on-
going of immediate concern and
challenge; and open n forever to be
pursued.
Englargement of mind, thus, does not
involve the serene quiet of mystic
contemplation but the dynamic and
unceasing quest for sense in life. It does not
result in "products" or believers, who
possess the One Truth, but rather fosters
thinkers who have a profound tolerance for
ambiguity and uncertainty, and yet who
have as well an enduring commitment to
some sort of "sense making" amidst the
buzzin' bloomin' confusion.
Consequently, the College offers no
invitation to see how everything fits into its
place but rather offers an invitation to find
out where the disagreements are
concerning how things fit into their places,
and indeed whether there are things to fit
and places to fit into. This invitation,
however, must not be misconstrued. It is
not an invitation to become an instant
colleague, one able immediately to
contribute creative ideas to the hurly burly
. the perplexity of
life is that in response
to one's no trump
bid one confronts an
off-tackle slant.
of the controversies. First must be mastered
the assumptions and views leading to and
allowing us to state the issues; and such
mastery involves the hard work of
memorizing, problem-solving, exercises in
writing essays, and the like. Nor is it an
invitation to become a fact monger, to
memorize all the material in grade grabber
fashion, yet to fail in the end to see the point
of the mastery. For the point is none other
than freeing the student from the ignorance
of the issues so that he or she can become
engaged in the cultural deliberation
regarding them. Nor is it an invitation to be a
discipline mole, to master the material and
see the issues but only within the confines of
one or two disciplines. Newman himself
worried about this "danger of being
absorbed and narrowed by a discipline,"
(VII, 6); for to be so narrowed is to lack a
sense of the sweep of the controversies
within even one's own discipline. Nor again
is it an invitation to become a sampler, to
hop arbitrarily from one discipline to
another. As Newman saw, that would be to
make "the error of distracting and
enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning
profusion of subjects; of implying that a
smattering in a dozen branches of study is
not shallowness, which it is, but
enlargement, which it is not," (VI, 8). Nor
finally it is an invitation to be a col1ector of
recipes -- to seek for the "practical"
directives from the various disciplines. For a
recipe, even a collection of them, lacks all
sense of the vagueness, ambiguity, and flux
built into the human situation. With a recipe
one can perhaps plan a dinner; but one
cannot manage-one's life. For the perplexity
in life is that in reply to one's no trump bid
one confronts an off-tackle slant.
Rather, with Newman, the College asks its
students to enlarge their minds. With him it
views this aim as much more significant than
any particular and immediate aim h say,
learning how to run a business or become a
doctor. And with him it views the
achievement of this aim as something far
more useful than the achievement of any
specific product. For what the College
seeks is not "products" -- things of dull
doings -- as if a person could be confined to
the mastery of facts, techniques, and
recipes. Rather, the College looks for
persons who are aware of themselves as
having choices within a matrix of cultural
issues and who recognize that these choices
will often make a difference. Such agents as
these will be far less likely to be taken in by
any simplistic account or method and will be
much more likely to meet successfully the
demands of a world in flux and radical
change -- where our distinctions are
repeatedly blurred, our predictions at best
come out only half true, our lives are
ambiguous and uncertain. In this sense our
education, our liberal education, alone can
be useful. For in its refusal to offer the easy
truth, the unambiguous "facts" and the
clear "life management recipes," in its
refusal to gloss over or disguise the
profound disagreements underlying our
pretty theories, and in all its profound
insistence on the subtle interconnectedness
of our ideas and our lives, the liberal
education more than any other kind of
study, makes us aware of "the real world."
Indeed it makes us free n the root meaning
of "liberal" -- by making us realize that the
real world is an open question. Welcome to
the College.
Edward W. James, Associate Professor
of Philosophy, has a number of
articles on philosophy of logic, philosophy of
science, and ethics in various philosophical
journals and anthologies. He is currently
completing a book on ethical pluralism, its
sources and standards.
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